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ABSTRACT
The debates around remote warfare have grown significantly over 
the last decade, leading to the term acquiring a certain buzz in the 
media, think-tank, and policy discourse. The lack of any serious 
attempt to reflect and take stock of this body of scholarship informs 
the scope of this special issue, in general, and of this article in 
particular. This paper addresses this former gap and, in doing so, 
serves a threefold purpose. First, to provide a state-of-the-art review 
of this emerging debate. Second, to both categorise what proper-
ties make a buzzword and to make the case for why existing remote 
warfare scholarship should be approached in this way. Third, to 
introduce how the various contributions to this special issue extend 
the debate’s conceptual, theoretical, and empirical parameters.
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Over the last decade, the language with which we have been studying political violence 
has sent the debate into “terminological and conceptual turmoil” (Rauta et al. 2019, 417). 
The late Colin Gray argued that academics and officials share a propensity to be 
“mesmerized by their own conceptual genius” (2007, 37). The (re)invention of concepts, 
he went on to explain, offered the “illusion of intellectual control” (Gray 2007, 37) that 
came, of course, at the significant cost of redundancy: the “discover[y] of a host of similar 
terms, each with its subtly distinctive meaning and probably its unique historical and 
cultural baggage” (Gray 2007, 37). This becomes clear when assessing the range of terms 
populating the semantic field of political violence: grey zone warfare (Hoffman 2016; 
Rauta and Monaghan 2021), hybrid warfare (Hoffman 2009; Lanoszka 2016; Renz 2016; 
Mälksoo 2018; Rauta 2020b), liquid warfare (Demmers and Gould 2018), post-heroic 
warfare (Luttwak 1995; Enemark 2013), proxy war(fare) (Rauta 2016, 2018, 2020a, 2021b; 
Groh 2019; Moghadam and Wyss 2020; Fox 2021), surrogate warfare (Krieg and Rickli 
2018; Karagiannis 2021), and vicarious warfare (Waldman 2021). With so many labels, 
“war has burst out of its old boundaries” (Brooks 2017, 13) to such an extent that we are 
“conceptually under-equipped to grasp, let alone counter, violent political challenges” 
(Ucko and Marks 2018, 208; for why this is a problem for research progress and 
cumulation, see; Rauta 2021a, 2021c). So, naturally, a new concept enters the fray: remote 
warfare.
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The study of remote warfare has grown significantly over the last decade across several 
fields, including security studies, international relations, and law, yet there have been no clear 
attempts at making sense of where the debate is, let alone where it is going. In the process, the 
term has become a feature of British think-tank debates (Knowles and Watson 2018; Watson 
and Karlshøj-Pedersen 2019), entered the policy realm (The Labour Party 2019; HC Deb 
16 December 2020), and has become used in media reporting on American drone operations 
(Robertson 2009). These usages have all contributed toward the term’s overall “buzz.” 
However, remote warfare has been subject to fairly limited conceptual scrutiny and evalua-
tion (Watts and Biegon 2019; Watson and McKay 2021). As a consequence, its intellectual 
development and application have remained largely atheoretical. This failure to take stock 
fully of remote warfare scholarship, coupled with larger conceptual and theoretical inatten-
tion, represents a major gap in our knowledge of this subject.
More importantly, addressing this gap would seem even more imperative given that 
remote warfare has been described, rather speculatively, as “central to modern state- 
sponsored violence” (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 3) and “the most common form of 
military engagement used by states” (Watson and Alasdair 2021, 7). In their clearest 
form, these are over-statements yet to be subject to empirical scrutiny, and these should 
be read as an attempted rhetorical validation of an emerging research programme. 
Irrespective of how one might position the relevance of remote warfare on the spectrum 
of contemporary conflict, its study must be built on strong conceptual foundations 
because it is “through language that one selects not just a name for the observed 
phenomenon, but where it starts and ends, as well as how one understands and explains 
it” (Rauta 2018, 451). Without this clarity, remote warfare scholarship will not only be 
unable to cut through the turmoil which characterises the wider debates on contempor-
ary political violence but, instead, will only deepen it.
This special issue is the first to provide a corrective to these gaps. It aims to advance 
the conceptual and theoretical study of remote warfare as an important step in support-
ing the continued and sustainable development of this nascent research agenda. The 
articles extend the empirical discussion manifold: (1) on this topic toward a more 
rigorous assessment of its history and relationship to new security problems and chal-
lenges such as assassination (Trenta 2021); (2) the dynamics and character of its use by 
actors other than the United States and Britain (Stoddard and Toltica 2021); (3) by 
extending remote warfare scholarship in new theoretical directions through the prism of 
ontological security (Riemann and Rossi 2021b); and (4) with a focus on the legitimacy of 
military capabilities (McDonald 2021). Other contributions develop the study of remote 
warfare’s constitutive “remoteness,” highlighting how clearer thinking on this subject can 
help us understand the empirical complexities of recent US military interventions (Watts 
and Biegon 2021). This special issue also makes space for a dissenting discussion on the 
limits of the notion in the form of a conceptual critique, in a way that invites considera-
tions of the degree to which remote warfare is truly analytically and practically useful 
(Rauta 2021c). In line with the overall scope of this collective exchange, all contributions 
pay at least some attention to conceptual issues as a starting point for broader theoretical 
and empirical evaluations. Taken as a whole, this special issue aims to make a timely 
intervention to remote warfare scholarship by investigating a complex set of conceptual 
and theoretical puzzles that push the debate further beyond its traditional focus on issues 
of efficacy and ethics (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 4).
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This extended introduction has three aims: to provide a state-of-the-art review of 
remote warfare scholarship; to assess the buzzword appeal of remote warfare; and to 
introduce the various contributions made by this special issue. It provides an overview of 
the current state of the debate, its direction of travel and, perhaps most importantly, the 
internal analytical tensions. It does so by building on existing reflections written from the 
perspective of those working on its legal (Ohlin 2017a), cultural (Adelman and Kieran 
2020), and policy (Watson and Alasdair 2021) implications. Our introduction performs 
an important contextualising role, outlining the special issue’s core themes and helping 
situate its contributions within this growing area of debate. For remote warfare scholars, 
it refreshes existing reflections on the overall state of the debate in line with the rapid 
expansion of the literature, which, amongst other contributions, has recently included 
two interdisciplinary edited collections (Adelman and Kieran 2020; Watson and Alasdair 
2021).
For a wider audience, this paper also develops the notion of a buzzword as a heuristic 
for assessing the introduction of terms into the semantic field on contemporary political 
violence. The notion of a buzzword is widely used across the social sciences (Cornwall 
and Brock 2005; Cornwall 2007; Ravitch 2007; Bensaude Vincent 2014; Foulds 2014; 
Routley 2014; Mason 2019; Schnable et al. 2021). Despite being mentioned in recent 
scholarship on political violence (Almäng 2019, 192; Rauta 2020a, 115), its application in 
this area has yet to be justified or deliberated. From a review of the existing literature, we 
identify four properties common to all buzzwords: they are indicative of current fashions 
or trends; are inherently vague; are associated with distinct actors who stretch the words’ 
meanings across various contexts; and are normative, having a role in setting or criti-
quing the policy agenda. Whilst “remote warfare” has yet to become widely used by 
policymakers or defence officials, it meets all of the criteria of a buzzword. To be clear: 
whilst the term buzzword has a pejorative connotation (Bensaude Vincent 2014, 238–39), 
our use of it should not be read as a denigration of either remote warfare as a subject of 
academic enquiry or the contributions made by existing contributors to the debate. 
Rather, we argue, it is through discussing and identifying remote warfare’s “contingent, 
situational and relational meanings,” to return to Cornwall and Brock’s understanding of 
a buzzword (2005, 2), that its intellectual foundations can be strengthened. In short: 
labelling remote warfare as a buzzword is not to call for a cessation of its study but rather, 
consistent with the overall aims of this special issue, to encourage greater attention to the 
conceptual issues involved with this research enterprise moving forward.
This introduction is structured into three sections. The first section reviews the 
existing interdisciplinary debates on remote warfare and reflects on the major trends 
within the debate. We highlight the ongoing expansion of remote warfare’s empirical 
referents to include the study of multiple security agents and practices. This trend has 
opened new research pathways, particularly when it comes to assessing the various policy 
failures associated with recent Western military interventions and their socio-political 
consequences. Yet, the addition of new referents has meant that the concept has travelled 
beyond its original focus on technology in war toward the distinct set of analytical and 
policy issues generated by delegation, creating a certain analytical tension of which 
participants to the debate should remain conscious. The second section examines remote 
warfare’s buzzworthy-ness. We show that, whilst remote warfare meets all four criteria of 
a buzzword, policymakers have generally avoided using the term remote warfare and that 
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academically this has yielded some intellectual shortcomings. The third section outlines 
the specific contributions this special issue makes to the debates on remote warfare and 
maps the individual arguments onto our scope and in reference to the broader debate.
The study of remote warfare
Remote warfare is a subject of multidisciplinary debate. The breadth of the scholarship 
on the topic complicates any evaluation of this nascent research debate while incurring 
the risk of categorising discrete areas of study by imposing a sense of analytical neatness, 
which belies the inherent messiness of the research enterprise and downplays areas of 
shared enquiry and dialogue. Whilst remaining sensitive to these points, five broad areas 
of remote warfare scholarship can be identified: (1) the ethics, legality, and experiences of 
using various weapons technologies; (2) the cultural representations and consequences of 
remote warfare technologies; (3) issues of delegation and privatisation in war; (4) the 
transparency, efficacy, and human costs of recent Western counterterrorism and stabi-
lisation operations; and (5) remote warfare’s geopolitical logics and sociopolitical effects.
Whilst these contributions have progressed knowledge in multiple new directions, 
they have also created a major tension within the debate. As we discuss, some accounts 
have developed a techno-centric understanding of remote warfare, which focuses on the 
impact of various weapons technologies on the conduct, cultural impact, and legality of 
contemporary political violence. Others promote a more outcome-oriented understand-
ing of remote warfare, which, whilst retaining some analytical focus on various weapons 
technologies, broadens the debate to study a wider set of security agents and security 
practices that share the effect of distancing an intervening agent’s conventional ground 
forces from frontline fighting. This analytical move opens up the discrete set of academic 
and policy issues centred on delegation in war. This pulling apart risks not only 
fragmenting the accumulation of knowledge but also reinforces the trend toward con-
ceptualising remote warfare in different ways. As we show below, each set of arguments 
also provides conceptual quandaries that require addressing.
The first set of studies emphasises the links between remote warfare scholarship and 
the study of technology in war. In the context of war, technology is used by humans to do 
things that the body cannot, whether this be to project force beyond the line of sight, react 
to the speed of machines, or strike adversaries with precision. With the notable exception 
of fully autonomous weapons systems, which would conceivably exercise their own 
algometric judgment (Bode and Huelss 2021), the use of most technologies in war can 
be understood as an extension of human agency. Whilst they may have some automated 
capabilities (Gusterson 2016, 33), the much-debated MQ-9 Reaper drone operated by the 
American, British, and French air forces are categorised as remotely piloted aircraft. 
Despite the immense physical distances at which these technologies enable force to be 
projected, their operators can exercise significant human judgment and control over the 
use of force (Chapa 2021).
Some have argued that remote warfare scholarship has been “dominated by the 
growing importance of armed drones, particularly in the US-led ‘war on terror’” 
(Huelss 2019, 356, emphasis added). The ethics and the efficacy of drone strikes, as 
with the experiences of British and American drone operators, have all been studied 
under the label remote warfare (DeShaw Rae 2014; Schulzke 2016; Lee 2018; Chapa 
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2021). Ohlin (2017a) has pushed to expand the empirical referents of remote warfare 
scholarship to also include the study of cyber-warfare capabilities and Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (AWS). Justifying this aggregation, Ohlin argues that these technolo-
gies share the characteristic of “allowing operators to use ever more discriminating force 
while also receding further in time and space from the target of the military operation” 
(2017a, 2). This wider understanding of remote warfare informs assessments of its 
legality (Crawford 2017; Cullen 2017; Ohlin 2017b), as well as the challenges that artificial 
intelligence presents to retaining meaningful human control over the use of force (Bode 
and Huelss 2021).
In the context of this set of arguments, several conceptual problems arise speaking to 
the gaps underscoring the aims of this special issue. To begin with, it is unclear whether 
the basic “unit” of interest is (1) the drone, AWS, or cyber-warfare capability, (2) how 
human agents interact with and experience the use of these technologies, (3) the effects of 
these technologies on the conduct, laws, and costs of war, or (4) a combination of all of 
these factors. Indeed, the exact technologies which should be studied under the umbrella 
of remote warfare remain contested. Cyber-warfare, for example, has been singled out as 
“a distinct venue for conflict,” which should be carved off from remote warfare scholar-
ship (Biegon and Watts 2020, 19–20). How these “remote” weapons technologies map to 
wider historical trends is also somewhat ambiguous. Drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper 
may eliminate the risk of physical (but not necessarily psychological) harm to their 
operators. AWS, however, could transform the risk-calculus and conduct of war, in 
part by shielding commanders from the emotional burdens of armed conflict (Bode 
and Huelss 2021, 220–21). Yet, both technologies can be treated as the latest manifesta-
tion of a wider trend reaching back millennia: “the historiography of warfare is replete 
with assertions that new capabilities to kill or injure from a distance have remade combat, 
well before the advent of the computerized technologies that draw so much critical 
attention today” (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 4). As Ohlin similarly notes, the use of 
new technologies to impose an asymmetric risk of physical harm “has been the goal of 
weapon design ever since the abandonment of the club as an instrument of blunt-force 
killing” (2017b, 19). In this way, the debate would benefit from a further exploration of 
the “remoteness” of remote warfare – the property which is used to justify the aggregated 
study of multiple weapons technologies (Ohlin 2017a) – as well as the development of 
clear conceptual foundations to help progress the debates on these issues.
Sharing a focus on the technological aspects of remote warfare, a second area of 
research investigates the “cultural entanglements, imprints, and consequences of remote 
warfare” (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 10). Animating this scholarship is a frustration with 
the perceived gridlock that characterises the debates on the efficacy and ethics of killing at 
a distance (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 4–10). The ways in which drone technologies alter 
the experience of war has received attention in the debate (Williams 2015; Gusterson 
2016; Lee 2018). A key notion emerging from this literature that overlaps with the debate 
on the cultural impact of remote warfare (Demmers and Gould 2021) is intimacy. This is 
a broad notion whose study is also a prominent feature of feminist approaches to 
geopolitics and security (Sjoberg 2015). In the context of remote warfare scholarship, 
intimacy is generally used as a shorthand to study the various “forms of proximity” 
(Adelman and Kieran 2020, 16), which, somewhat paradoxically, are created through 
intervention at a distance. The cultural strand of remote warfare scholarship broadens 
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the study of intimacy in remote warfare by probing the representations of drone pilots 
and “remote wars” in literature (Buchanan 2020; Jelfs 2020), television shows such as 
Homeland (Bjering and Graae 2020) and video games (Richardson 2020). Contributors 
to this section of the debate have also traced the genealogy of the contemporary use of 
drones to the writings of early aviation theorists such as Giulio Douhet (Zeitlin 2020) and 
to the culture of “technological determinism” that has shaped the American military for 
over a century (Walker 2018). Next to the above-mentioned requirement for historicis-
ing, therefore, sits a conceptual demand for a cultural account of the analytical assump-
tions generated by arguments that are over-reliant on technology.
Elsewhere in the debate, there has been a push to reconceptualise remote warfare as 
something greater than the use of new technologies. This literature reorients the debates 
focus away from direct combat operations through practices like air strikes toward 
indirect efforts to work through local security forces and commercial agents. Studies 
have examined the role of different security practices (military assistance and intelligence 
sharing) and agents (private military security contractors and special operation forces) in 
remote warfare (Watts and Biegon 2017; Krieg 2018; Kinsey and Olsen 2021; Richards 
2021). These studies address similar questions: in what ways do particular security 
agents/practices qualify as remote warfare? What role have they played in recent 
British and American defence policy? And what are the risks and consequences of 
these practices for the oversight and transparency of military intervention? 
Intentionally or not, this literature reorients the thematic focus away from the study of 
technology in war toward the separate debates on delegation in war: an intervening 
agent’s indirect attempts to “build partner capacity,” and work “by, with and through” 
other agents – whether these be foreign security forces or security contractors.
This trend began in the notion of remote-control warfare coined by Paul Rogers in 
2013. The failure of the nation-building campaign in Iraq, he argued, accelerated a major 
trend within Western defence policy: the use of drones, private military security con-
tractors and Special Forces to minimise – if not avoid – the deployment of “boots on the 
ground” in frontline fighting (Rogers 2013). This conceptualisation of remote warfare 
was extended by the Oxford Research Group’s (ORG) Remote Control Project (renamed 
the Remote Warfare Programme in 2018), a now-defunct, London-based think-tank that 
advocated for more sustainable and accountable approaches to security (Moran 2015). 
Through its activities, which included publishing practitioner-oriented reports on the 
conduct of British counterterrorism and stabilisation operations (Knowles and Watson 
2018; Watson and Megan 2019), the ORG helped develop a network of researchers to 
assess, among other topics, the failures and costs of recent Western military interventions 
in the Sahel (Goxho 2021) and Yemen (Shiban and Molyneux 2021). A resultant con-
ceptual requirement for the future of the debate is, thus, to balance the inherently policy- 
practitioner origins of the notion with its ability to translate into a robust analytical 
concept useful for the academic debates. Equally important is the focus on distinguishing 
variations of delegated interventionism into a conceptual property of relevance to the 
definitions of remote warfare.
The more holistic conceptualisation of remote warfare pioneered by the ORG and 
others provides the empirical framework for a fifth area. The focus here is less on 
prescribing changes to how remote warfare should be approached in policy and more 
on examining its geopolitical logic(s) and sociopolitical consequences. Biegon and 
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Watts argue, for example, that remote warfare was central to the “retooling” of 
American primacy following the Iraq War (2020) and has also played an important 
role in maintaining security partnerships with states involved with counterterrorism 
operations in the Horn of Africa (Biegon and Watts 2021). Demmers and Gould 
(2021) have examined remote warfare’s appeal to Western democracies, paying 
particular attention to the ways in which it has obscured democratic oversight over 
the use of force and concealed the human costs of political violence. Riemann and 
Rossi (2021a) have explored the “normative commitment” to distancing “privilege 
spaces” in the Global North from the realities of political violence, and the ways in 
which the growing use of military contractors have altered societal understandings of 
sacrifice and remembrance. As with the policy-oriented literature on remote warfare 
from which it has drawn inspiration, this segment provides a more holistic empirical 
framework for studying how Western states have projected force in recent years. Yet, 
since the trend in Western warfighting toward intervention from a distance and the 
study of its social-political effects are already prominent features of the semantic field 
on contemporary political violence, it raises questions about remote warfare’s con-
ceptual distinctiveness and boundaries of contrast, to use Rauta’s explanation of how 
terms overlap in the wider semantic field (2021b).
Thematically, the five branches of remote warfare scholarship speak to a common 
set of questions. Is there anything new about the recent trend toward distancing 
conventional ground forces from frontline fighting? What explains this trend? How 
are the various forms of distance created through this process experienced by 
different audiences? Is intervention from a distance ethical and efficient? What are 
the effects of intervention from a distance on politics, society, law, and culture? Their 
principal point of divergence is the relative weight given to the study of technology 
vis-à-vis delegation in war. As we have shown, across five sets of arguments, remote 
warfare is deployed with multiple meanings, to address different empirical problems, 
and by bringing together policy, practitioner, journalistic, and academic perspectives. 
This presents an invitation to think more creatively about the concept by trying to 
make sense of its contradictions as well as to harness its analytical potential.
The notion of remote warfare: worth the buzz?
Having outlined the uses and abuses of the notion, one cannot but agree with the fact that 
remote warfare has acquired a certain “buzz.” This raises a set of questions: is remote 
warfare a buzzword? What does this mean? And does this offer a productive pathway to 
articulate a conceptual and theoretical framework for remote warfare? As we argue in this 
section, the term “remote warfare” meets all four criteria of a buzzword which can be 
generated from how the notion is understood throughout the social science literature: it is 
indicative of current fashions or trends; it has an inherent vagueness; it has been associated 
with distinct actors who stretch the words’ meanings across various contexts; and it is 
normative, having a role in critiquing or supporting the policy agenda. As a buzzword, 
“remote warfare” has value as a heuristic; it offers a useful shortcut for navigating the 
debates on contemporary political violence, providing a starting point for further study.
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“Buzzwords” as heuristics
Buzzwords tend to capture and reflect the zeitgeist. They help define the “hot topics” 
of a given moment (Schnable et al. 2021, 26–27). Whilst this suggests that they can 
have a degree of presentism and ephemerality, they can also be convenient ways of 
providing “new and shiny concepts” (Mason 2019, 213). Because they are seen as 
denoting something that is in vogue, buzzwords can be uncharitably likened to fads. In 
this way, they are sometimes depicted as being detrimental to social science (Alvesson 
et al. 2017, 10, 20). Others point to how the notion of a buzzword has helped shed light 
on a variety of challenging subjects, ranging from development discourse (Cornwall 
2007), feminist foreign policy (Mason 2019) and technoscience (Bensaude Vincent 
2014). A sufficiently loud “buzz” can focus attention on novel trends, setting the stage 
for more detailed empirical, conceptual, and theoretical inquiry. Against this back-
ground, we argue in this sub-section that buzzwords often function as useful 
heuristics.
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been multiple waves of conceptual innova-
tion aimed at capturing the global trend toward more indirect forms of military inter-
vention conducted from a distance, without the deployment of large numbers of the 
intervening agent’s conventional ground forces. During the 1990s, the humanitarian 
interventions conducted principally from the air in the Balkans prompted debates on 
post-heroic warfare (Luttwak 1995), virtual war (Ignatieff 2001) and virtuous war (Der 
Derian 2001). The Obama administration’s turn toward what it labelled “innovative, low- 
cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve [US] security objectives” (Department of 
Defense 2012, 3) in the aftermath of the nation-building campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq prompted the arrival, (re-)discovery, or invention of some of the terms outlined at 
the start of this article.
Our review of the debate pointed to remote warfare being caught between its under-
standing as “an approach used by states to counter threats at a distance’ (Watson and 
Alasdair 2021, 7) and a form of “technologized warfare” (Adelman and Kieran 2020, 11). 
These differences are consistent with buzzwords more generally, as their (relative) 
ambiguity is constitutive of their ability to generate “buzz” and travel widely across the 
discursive terrain. Buzzwords are intrinsically capacious (Schnable et al. 2021, 27–28). 
They cannot have singular meanings. This has elicited comparisons between buzzwords 
and Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1955; Cornwall 2007, 472). 
Buzzwords are different, however, because contestations over meaning are “drowned 
out” by the noise, even as the “buzz” creates the appearance of consensus (however thin 
or superficial). In the case of buzzwords, there tends to be agreement on the importance 
of the term, if not its precise meaning.
Writing about buzzwords in the context of development policy, Cornwall and Brock 
argue that they often act as “fuzz-words,” particularly when they are used for reasons of 
political expedience (2005, 10). In an influential report for the United Nations, Cornwall 
and Brock wrote that it was an “almost inherent property of buzzwords that they facilitate 
a multiplicity of contingent, situational and relational meanings” (2005, 160). The “fuzz” 
of the buzzword speaks to the inability of the term in question to produce concrete or 
actionable consensus; as buzzwords are negotiated politically and institutionally, differ-
ences in perspective reveal contestation over meaning, impacting how the buzzword is 
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translated into the policy process (Cornwall and Brock 2005, 2). At the same time, the 
buzz/fuzz-word obscures these complications, in part because of the multiple ways in 
which the term finds resonance.
Different (groups of) actors can utilise buzzwords in different ways (Cornwall and 
Brock 2005; Schnable et al. 2021). The abstractness of such terms allows their meaning 
to be modified as they travel across different audiences (Foulds 2014). Contingency 
and real-world events can drive such changes. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, 
and its subsequent interventions elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East below the 
threshold of open hostilities, generated debate on proxy wars (Rauta 2016) and hybrid 
warfare (Hoffman 2009; Lanoszka 2016; Renz 2016; Mälksoo 2018; Rauta 2020b). In 
the case of hybrid warfare scholarship, this took its study in a new direction and away 
from its focus a decade earlier on irregular and terrorist threats in the Middle East 
(Hoffman 2009). Semantic adoption can also have an evolutionary character. For 
instance, “the use of buzzwords within published academic studies could hypotheti-
cally occur either after or before practitioners popularise the terms.” Thus, buzzwords 
tend to start as (abstract) concepts rather than “objective” phenomena (Schnable et al. 
2021, 29).
As noted by Cornwall (2007, 478), it is a peculiar feature of buzzwords that, “just as 
they appear to rise ‘above’ ideology, they are densely populated with ideological projects 
and positions.” This normative function has both negative and positive features – 
negative in the sense that buzzwords, like jargon, can “mystify” the public, providing 
a false sense of reality (Ravitch 2007); positive because they frame solutions to problems 
and can focus the policy agenda by facilitating greater policy consensus (Cornwall and 
Brock 2005; Bensaude Vincent 2014; Mason 2019). In the case of development policy, 
buzzwords are understood to have legitimised the general direction of certain policy 
agendas, even as they have co-opted opposition and deradicalised challenges to the status 
quo (Routley 2014; Schnable et al. 2021). In some instances, the heuristic function of 
buzzwords means they become a “slogan” or “advertisement” for the agendas they help 
consolidate (Bensaude Vincent 2014).
Remote warfare as a buzzword
Remote warfare is presented by its supporters as fashionable. According to those who 
deploy the concept, it reflects clear trends in current practices of military intervention. 
“Across the globe,” write Watson and McKay, “there is a discernible trend of states 
engaging militarily from a distance” (2021, 10). It is a trend seemingly comprised of other 
trends – risk aversion, technological advances, networking (Demmers and Gould 2021, 
37–39) – which have coalesced today. The nature of these trends, of course, is open to 
debate, remaining largely unsupported by the established research clusters of military 
intervention and conflict research, whose rigorous conceptual categories and robust 
trend assessments methodology outpace and outmatch such statements. However, 
there is a general consensus that intervention from a distance – whether achieved 
through the use of weapons technologies or a wider set of security agents and practices – 
can reduce the various costs associated with military intervention. This has proved 
appealing to states in recent decades, and the trend has grown more pronounced in the 
wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This trendiness would seem to follow from 
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a concurrent fascination with drones and drone warfare. Indeed, the “remote” appella-
tion stems, in part, from the study of “remote control” technologies that is an integral 
part of the interdisciplinary debates on drone warfare.
“Remote warfare” is a vague term. References to its imprecision have become routine. 
This is wholly consistent with buzzwords more generally; their elusiveness being con-
stitutive of their ability to generate buzz, allowing them to “travel” across the discursive 
terrain. The “remoteness” of remote warfare has been open to multiple interpretations. It 
is understood to come from the physical separation of an intervening state’s conventional 
ground forces from frontline fighting (Watson and Alasdair 2021, 7), but also the 
distancing of Western publics from the daily experiences and sacrifices of war 
(Adelman and Kieran 2020, 8; Brunck 2020; Demmers and Gould 2021; Riemann and 
Rossi 2021a). At the same time, however, other contributions have unpacked the various 
“intimacies” – or proximities – that are simultaneously produced through these actions. 
These include various forms of civilian harm (Shiban and Molyneux 2021; Watson and 
Alasdair 2021, 14–16) and the psychological stress experienced by some Western drone 
operators (Williams 2015; Lee 2018). Speaking to what Riemann and Rossi (2021a, 82) 
label its “radical duality,” remote warfare has, thus, simultaneously invited debate on how 
the realities of political violence are pulled closer for some audiences whilst being pushed 
further away from others. The study of these dialectical processes (Jelfs 2020) speaks to 
the abstractness of its existing meaning.
The ambiguity around “remote warfare” is due in part to its association with different 
actors. As alluded to in our earlier review, part of the popularity of the term appears to 
stem from its ability to resonate differently with researchers, observers, and critics across 
disciplinary or institutional contexts. Given the increasing scope of the security agents 
and practices studied under its umbrella, remote warfare’s ability to generate both buzz 
and multiple meanings is intuitive. Furthermore, problems of precision and meaning are 
not contained to recent remote warfare scholarship. The concepts of hybrid warfare and 
grey zone war have also been challenged and/or questioned over their ambiguity (Rauta 
2016, 2020b; Ucko and Marks 2018; Almäng 2019). Even before they become buzzwords, 
the meaning of newly coined terms can be opaque, muddying the contexts that determine 
the boundaries of war itself (Almäng 2019). The contributors to this special issue offer 
different and, in some respects, competing definitions of remote warfare. This is in 
keeping with the capaciousness of buzzwords, as we understand them, and shows the 
value of buzzwords-as-heuristics for generating vibrant research agendas.
In the case of remote warfare, the term took root outside of the academy. The objective 
was not to use jargon to obfuscate the phenomenon but to find the right language to draw 
attention to it. In 2014, the ORG, a London-based charity and think-tank advocating for 
more sustainable and accountable approaches to security, created the Remote Control 
Project, which would be recast as the Remote Warfare programme in 2018. Again, this 
illustrates the salience of the “remote” adjective, which, through its association with 
“remote control” devices, evoked the perceived centrality of drone technologies to recent 
Western security practices. The ORG helped consolidate a wider network of NGOs and 
civil society organisations working on the oversight of remote warfare, with particular 
focus on human rights, governance, and transparency issues. This helped bring the 
concept and terminology to new audiences – particularly in Great Britain, but also 
elsewhere.
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As a buzzword, remote warfare has a normative dimension. It has often been 
approached as a set of real-world practices which, implicitly or explicitly, need changing. 
Adelman and Kieran (2020, 11) emphasise the importance of challenging remote war-
fare’s depiction by state actors and promoting a “continual reconsideration of scholarly 
assumptions about it.” The ORG scrutinised several policy challenges created by remote 
warfare (Watson and Alasdair 2021, 14–21), recommending changes to the doctrine, 
training and planning approach used within the British military (Knowles and Watson 
2018). Riemann and Rossi (2021a, 79) point to the “ethical imperative” at the centre of 
the real-world practices of remote warfare, and others call to “‘make strange’ the evolving 
normalisation of remote warfare as the lesser evil – as precise, efficient wars of necessity” 
(Demmers and Gould 2021, 43). Remote warfare is also understood to undermine 
elements of international law, even if complexities mean that its effects are not as one- 
sidedly negative as is sometimes suggested by activists (Crawford 2017; Cullen 2017; 
Ohlin 2017b). These understandings of remote warfare as normatively undesirable 
conceivably influences the thinking behind whether the label is considered appropriate 
in policymaking and defence circles.
As Bensaude Vincent notes, “the term ‘buzzword’ itself has a pejorative connota-
tion” (2014, 238–39). The same might be said about remote warfare. Some history is 
instructive here. William Fitts Ryan, a Democratic Congressman from New York, was 
a public critic of the Vietnam War and the first member of Congress to vote against 
additional funding for the conflict (Knight 1972). In a 1968 debate on defence appro-
priations, Ryan claimed that it was “as if the Vietnam war has become a permanent and 
inevitable fixture in American life, like the interminable, remote warfare predicted in 
Orwell’s 1984” (Congressional Record House 1968, 16675, emphasis added). Striking 
a similar tone, a 1973 issue of the socialist magazine Science for the People singled out 
remote warfare as a key tool of “American Imperialists” and “a war of human machines 
against the human body” (New England Action Research 1973, 39, 42). In the Vietnam 
context, remote warfare was seen as a techno-political challenge to be overcome, in 
part by raising popular awareness of its hidden costs and threats to democratic 
governance. This normative undercurrent continues to inform much of the multi-
disciplinary debate on remote warfare, resulting in a call to “mak[e] visible . . . [the] 
moral and political challenges that this new way of war has given rise to” (Demmers 
and Gould 2021, 43).
Although remote warfare meets the criteria of a buzzword, it is therefore under-
standable that politicians and officials have used the term only sparingly. It has not (as of 
yet) been utilised explicitly to set policy agendas so much as critique existing practices. In 
its 2019 General Election manifesto, the (opposition) Labour Party pledged “to assess the 
security challenges facing Britain, including new forms of hybrid, cyber and remote 
warfare” as part of a Strategic Defence and Security Review (The Labour Party 2019). The 
term remote warfare is not defined in this context and is mentioned only once. In 
December 2020, Alyn Edward Smith, Member of Parliament for Stirling and the 
Scottish National Party’s shadow spokesperson for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, presented a Private Members Bill on “Arms (Exports and Remote Warfare).” 
Amongst its other aims, this bill was intended to “prohibit the use of lethal autonomous 
weapons” (HC Deb 16 December 2020). It also aimed to create more “effective mechan-
isms for democratic oversight or transparency” on both arms exports and drone 
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operations, whilst also “updat[ing] UK policy on drones, particularly on the rules of 
engagement, adherence to international law, and . . . post-strike assessments to learn 
lessons on how the technology is evolving.”
Two tentative conclusions can be drawn from the term’s use in recent British policy 
discussions. First, there appears to be a lag – if not contestation – of the recent 
reconceptualisation of remote warfare as “an approach used by states to counter threats 
at a distance” (Watson and Alasdair 2021, 7). Where the term has been used in a policy 
setting, its meaning centres on weapons technologies like drones and AWS. The bill 
introduced by MP Smith, noted above, deals mainly with British arms exports, and its 
title, “Exports and Remote Warfare” [HC Deb 16 December 2020, emphasis added], 
implies the sale of military equipment is considered separate from remote warfare. 
Second and perhaps more importantly for our purposes, the term’s use by policymakers 
suggests the underlying pejorative connotations traceable to the Vietnam War have 
persisted, albeit in a form reconfigured to the particular contingencies of twenty-first 
century British politics. On the rare occasion that “remote warfare” has been used in 
policy debates, then, it continues to be approached as something that needs to be 
scrutinised, regulated and ultimately “made better.”
Special issue structure and contributions
The term’s recent trendiness points to the importance of the phenomena that its use is 
meant to capture. Despite the various contestations that have played out, remote warfare 
is a substantive topic, which has the potential to make a series of important and timely 
contributions to the debate on contemporary political violence. The contributions to this 
special issue explore an array of conceptual, theoretical, and empirical puzzles. They do 
not come to a consensus on how remote warfare should be conceptualised. Instead, they 
propose a variety of pathways for moving the debate forward, with the overarching aim of 
bringing greater clarity to its meaning for academics, researchers, and practitioners.
In their contribution, Stoddard and Toltica examine Saudi Arabia’s and the United 
Arab Emirates’ recent intervention in Yemen as a case of remote warfare. In doing so, 
they take an important first step toward addressing the gap within the outcome-oriented 
literature on remote warfare for the detailed, empirical study of non-Western approaches 
to remote warfare. As Stoddard and Toltica trace, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates have also combined the use of airpower, special operation forces, private 
military security contractors, and local partners to intervene from a distance, if in 
a different operational and strategic context. Drawing from practice theory, Stoddard 
and Toltica develop a novel conceptualisation of remote warfare as a set of practices, 
which, whilst varying in its exact tactical configuration, produces the strategic effect of 
advancing a state’s political interests without the deployment of large numbers of its 
conventional ground forces. According to the authors, this practice-based understanding 
of remote warfare helps “de-essentialise” the concept by moving beyond binary questions 
of classification. It provides a framework for the more nuanced conceptualisation of 
remote warfare as a continuum of different configurations of tactical practices. Such 
a move, they argue, provides a stronger foundation for comparative studies of the use of 
remote warfare by different actors, and helps to better position remote warfare within the 
larger debate on the changing character of political violence.
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In the following paper, Trenta proposes a timely conceptual distinction between the 
remoteness and the covertness of remote warfare. Through a review of recent remote 
warfare scholarship, Trenta highlights the problematic conflation of “two distinct dimen-
sions that characterise deployments of force and, more broadly, governments’ engage-
ment in conflict and political violence” (2021). Existing understandings of the 
remoteness of remote warfare, he argues, “has come to conflate the means or methods 
governments use in the deployment of violence and the ways in which they deploy these 
methods.” To disentangle these notions, Trenta proposes that remoteness be approached 
through the means of military power used by an intervening agent to advance its strategic 
interests, being understood as the degree of physical distance separating the armed 
combatants involved in conflict. Trenta argues covertness, in contrast, should be 
approached through how military force is deployed, more specifically whether it is 
used in an opaque or overt manner. This distinction makes a timely contribution to 
remote warfare scholarship by providing the conceptual clarity needed to move toward 
a more sophisticated understanding of the complex interplay of remoteness and covert-
ness in political violence. Trenta takes an important step in this direction through 
a detailed empirical study of the US government’s use of assassination as a foreign policy 
tool since the beginning of the Cold War. In this way, Trenta also makes a second set of 
important contributions to remote warfare scholarship: not only does his paper help 
extend the historical focus beyond post-9/11 counterterrorism and stabilisation opera-
tions toward the Cold War but also develops the study of assassination as a remote 
warfare practice.
Riemann and Rossi make a much-needed corrective to the debate on the use of 
Security Force Assistance (and similar practices, including security cooperation) as 
a form of remote warfare. They theorise its growing prominence in British foreign and 
defence policy through an ontological security perspective to explore the role of self- 
identity as a driver of intervention from a distance. In this way, Riemann and Rossi begin 
to reorient remote warfare scholarship away from a narrow focus on “security-as- 
survival” toward “security-of-being.” The United Kingdom’s growing use of SFA, they 
argue, can be mapped to its “autobiographical narrative” – a “story” which actors create 
about themselves in order to understand and navigate the world – which they call 
a “global engagement identity.” At its core, this “global engagement identity” centres 
on the United Kingdom’s self-perception as a globally active island nation with a great 
power mindset. In an era of increasing uncertainty, the growing prominence of SFA is 
seen to serve three purposes: “first, it reinforces/reinstates routinized relationships with 
significant others; second, it re-establishes a sense of temporal continuity in the UK’s 
activities; and third, it tames the existential anxiety generated by the current uncertain 
and unpredictable international security environment” (Riemann and Rossi 2021a, 
2021b). In this way, Riemann and Rossi (2021b) conceptualise remote warfare as an 
“attempt to recreate order and hierarchy to keep threats at a distance, establish routines 
and stability, and (re)establish a coherent autobiographical narrative.”
Similar to Trenta’s contribution, Watts and Biegon investigate the “remoteness” that 
constitutes remote warfare. This examination is a step toward identifying the analytical 
specificity of remote warfare within wider debates on contemporary political violence. 
According to the authors, it also holds analytical relevance for understanding wider 
empirical developments including the complexities of recent US military interventions. 
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As is clear from discussion of the American public’s relative detachment from the 
realities of war (see, for example, Adelman and Kieran 2020, 9), there is growing scholarly 
interest in the topic. When it comes to remoteness itself, however, there is a persistent 
and troubling lack of clarity. Remoteness, Watts and Biegon argue, exists on 
a continuum, and its study should be separated from the debates on physical distance, 
even if the two notions are somewhat connected. Defining remoteness in relation to the 
public’s socio-psychological detachment from the realities of political violence, as 
mediated through knowledge and spectatorship of the use of military force, the authors 
build on recent analyses of the cultural and sociopolitical effects of remote warfare. The 
dynamics of remoteness are illustrated and “unpacked” by way of an often-overlooked 
case of remote warfare: US intervention in Libya during and after the “Arab Spring.” The 
Libya case shows that, while the physical distancing of US forces from frontline fighting 
contributed toward the public’s remoteness, a thorough accounting of remote warfare 
requires us to consider the public’s role and positioning with respect to the conflict.
Next, McDonald explores the military capabilities that are used as part of remote 
warfare through the prism of political legitimacy. In doing so, he questions the impor-
tance of remote warfare scholarship to wider debates on the transformation of military 
power. Following a theme also discussed by Stoddard and Toltica (2021), McDonald 
proposes conceptualising remote warfare as a family resemblance of legitimacy problems 
created through the use of military capabilities. The concept of remote warfare, he argues, 
is “difficult to successfully differentiate and distinguish from like concepts.” It “covers 
a variety of diverging phenomena, which are problematized for diverging reasons, and its 
novelty is unclear” (2021). For McDonald, remote warfare cannot, therefore, be 
approached as a particular category of war. Its reconceptualisation as a family resem-
blance of legitimacy problems provides a clearer boundary of contrast by way of its “focus 
upon the consequences of integrating military capabilities at a systems level in order to 
generate military effects” (2021). It also helps better explain remote warfare’s newness – 
a subject of limited existing debate (Watts and Biegon 2019; Zeitlin 2020; Watson and 
Alasdair 2021, 10–14) – in terms of the greater direction that policymakers can exercise 
over the use of military capabilities overseas. Building on this framework, McDonald 
continues to explore the core legitimacy problems involved with remote warfare, exam-
ining the role of state agency, government agency and responsibility. His analysis 
concludes with a discussion of the legitimacy of the infrastructure and basing arrange-
ments needed to intervene at a distance.
Finally, Rauta’s paper offers a dissenting view that questions the extent to which “remote 
warfare” should be advanced as a conceptual alternative. Rauta’s article presents a conceptual 
critique that locates “remote warfare” and its conceptual problems in the broader semantic 
field of political violence. As one of the latest arrivals in the ever-expanding vocabulary of the 
study of political violence, “remote warfare” has contributed to a democratisation of the 
debate around war and warfare by appealing to the practitioner, policy, think tank, and 
academic worlds in some shape or form, thereby permitting an intellectual exchange 
relatively unconstrained by each worlds’ modus operandi. Nevertheless, for “remote warfare” 
to make significant strides, its proponents need to engage with the notion’s intellectual 
infrastructure, and in this way, engage in the wider debate on how we think about political 
violence. Rauta’s article argues that “remote warfare” should not be an exception, especially 
as – so far – the record stacks against the notion. First, Rauta unpacks the lack of analytical 
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value: what intellectual leverage does it hold over existing terms making similar claims? 
Second, he presents an analysis of the many paradoxes with which “remote warfare” arrives, 
all requiring examination before casting the notion as relevant to the discourse on contem-
porary war and warfare.
Conclusion: is remote warfare worth the buzz or just a buzzkill?
Debates on contemporary political violence are complicated and contentious. The seman-
tic field has become populated with a growing list of terms, newly coined or repurposed, 
which tend to reflect comparable concerns and speak to similar processes and phenomena. 
Of course, the introduction of new concepts is an important tool for creative thinking 
about political violence in the twenty-first century. Conceptual innovation can help under-
line inadequacies in the existing lexicon and provide a window into areas of the debate that 
have been overlooked or marginalised (Ucko and Marks 2018). Yet, the proliferation of 
concepts may also foster disorder and a general sense of scholarly unease. For those 
operating in this field, the dizzying array of overlapping and competing labels can create 
a troubling sense of redundancy; the excitement of exploring elements of the perceived 
zeitgeist can be undermined by a sense of confusion and narcissism of small differences.
Such “buzzkill” may be understandable, but it is not inevitable. Although we acknowl-
edge the challenges that accompany the further development of a relatively new concept, 
the fact of the matter is that “remote warfare” has already firmly established itself in the 
study of political violence, having taken root across a range of disciplinary and profes-
sional contexts. As we discussed, it has grown more prominent in recent years, becoming 
a “buzzword” used not only by academics but by policymakers and practitioners. 
Thinking about remote warfare as a buzzword means approaching the latter heuristically. 
This move does not mean discrediting existing contributions, which can stimulate 
cutting-edge scholarship on a range of interrelated topics and issues. At a minimum, it 
offers an entrance into messy debates that extend well beyond any single conceptual 
framing – a topic which is explored further in the remainder of this special issue
Acknowledgments
We thank our contributors to the special issue, the two anonymous reviewers for their very con-
structive feedback, and the journal’s editor, Simon Smith, for his support. We share equal authorship.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
The authors have no funding to report.
DEFENCE STUDIES 441
Notes on contributors
Rubrick Biegon is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent. His research 
interests include US foreign policy, international security, and remote warfare.
Vladimir Rauta is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations in the School of Politics, 
Economics, and International Relations at the University of Reading. His research focuses on 
conflict delegation and proxy wars and has been published or is forthcoming in journals such as 
International Studies Review, International Relations, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Civil Wars, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, RUSI Journal, and Contemporary Security Policy.
Tom F. A. Watts is a Teaching Fellow in International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of 
London, and a researcher on the AUTONORMS project based at the University of Southern 
Denmark. His research focuses on American foreign and security policy, remote warfare, and 




Tom F. A. Watts http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5385-6334
References
Adelman, Rebecca A., and David Kieran. 2020. “Introduction: Rethinking Killing at a Distance.” In 
Remote Warfare: New Cultures of Violence, edited by Adelman, Rebecca A. and David Kieran, 
1–28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Almäng, Jan. 2019. “War, Vagueness and Hybrid War.” Defence Studies 19 (2): 189–204. 
doi:10.1080/14702436.2019.1597631.
Alvesson, Mats, Yiannis Gabriel, and Roland Paulsen. 2017. Return to Meaning: A Social Science 
with Something to Say. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bensaude Vincent, Bernadette. 2014. “The Politics of Buzzwords at the Interface of Technoscience, 
Market and Society: The Case of ‘Public Engagement in Science.’” Public Understanding of 
Science 23 (3): 238–253. doi:10.1177/0963662513515371.
Biegon, Rubrick, and Tom F. A. Watts. 2021. “Security Cooperation as Remote Warfare: The US in 
the Horn of Africa.” In Remote Warfare, edited by McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and 
Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 152–172. Bristol: E-IR Publishing. Interdisciplinary Perspectives.
Biegon, Rubrick, and Tom. F. A. Watts. 2020. “Remote Warfare and the Retooling of American 
Primacy.” Geopolitics, Online First.
Bjering, Jens Borrebye, and Andreas Immanuel Graae. 2020. “From Hermeneutics to Archives: 
Parasites and Predators in Homeland.” In Remote Warfare: New Cultures of Violence, edited by 
Adelman, Rebecca A. and David Kieran, 79–102. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bode, Ingvild, and Hendrik Huelss. 2021. “The Future of Remote Warfare? Artificial Intelligence, 
Weapons Systems and Human Control.” In Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
edited by McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 218–232. Bristol: 
E-IR Publishing.
Brooks, Rosa. 2017. How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything. New York: 
Simon & Schuster.
Brunck, Annika. 2020. “‘Wanted Dead or Alive’: The Hunt for Osama Bin Laden.” In Remote 
Warfare: New Cultures of Violence, edited by Adelman, Rebecca A. and David Kieran, 177–200. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Buchanan, David. 2020. “Warrior Woundings, Warrior Culture: An Ethos for Post-9/11 American 
War Culture.” In Remote Warfare: New Cultures of Violence, edited by Adelman, Rebecca A. 
and David Kieran, 53–77. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
442 R. BIEGON ET AL.
Chapa, Joseph. 2021. “Human Judgement in Remote Warfare.” In Remote Warfare 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and 
Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 199–217. Bristol: E-International Relations.
Congressional Record House. 1968. “House of Representatives- Tuesday.” Accessed June 11, 1968. 
https://www.congress.gov/90/crecb/1968/06/11/GPO-CRECB-1968-pt13-2-2.pdf 
Cornwall, Andrea. 2007. “Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse.” 
Development in Practice 17 (4–5): 471–484. doi:10.1080/09614520701469302.
Cornwall, Andrea, and Karen Brock. 2005. Beyond Buzzwords: “Poverty Reduction,” 
“Participation” and “Empowerment” in Development Policy. United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development, Overarching Concerns Programme Paper Number 10, 
November.
Crawford, Emily. 2017. “The Principle of Distinction and Remote Warfare.” In Research 
Handbook on Remote Warfare, edited by Ohlin, Jens David, 50–78. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing.
Cullen, Anthony. 2017. “The Characterization of Remote Warfare under International 
Humanitarian Law.” In Research Handbook on Remote Warfare, edited by Ohlin, Jens David, 
110–132. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Demmers, Jolle, and Lauren Gould. 2018. “An Assemblage Approach to Liquid Warfare: 
AFRICOM and the ‘Hunt’ for Joseph Kony.” Security Dialogue 49 (5): 364–381. doi:10.1177/ 
0967010618777890.
Demmers, Jolle, and Lauren Gould. 2021. “The Remote Warfare Paradox: Democracies, Risk 
Aversion and Military Engagement.” In Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by 
McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 34–47. Bristol: 
E-International Relations.
Department of Defense. 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership. Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.
Der Derian, James. 2001. Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment- 
Network. Abingdon: Routledge.
DeShaw Rae, James. 2014. Analyzing the Drone Debates: Targeted Killing, Remote Warfare, and 
Military Technology. London: Springer.
Enemark, Christian. 2013. Armed Drones and the Ethics of War: Military Virtue in a Post-heroic 
Age. New York: Routledge.
Foulds, Kim. 2014. “Buzzwords at Play: Gender, Education, and Political Participation in Kenya.” 
Gender and Education 26 (6): 653–671. doi:10.1080/09540253.2014.933190.
Fox, Amos C. 2021. “Strategic Relationships, Risk, and Proxy War.” Journal of Strategic Security 
14 (2): 1–24. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.14.2.1879.
Gallie, W. B. 1955. “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 
167–198.
Goxho, Delina. 2021. “Remote Warfare in the Sahel and a Role for the EU.” In Remote Warfare 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and 
Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 96–109. Bristol: E-International Relations.
Gray, Colin S. 2007. “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters.” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 1 (2): 35–57.
Groh, Tyrone. 2019. Proxy War: The Least Bad Option. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
Gusterson, Hugh. 2016. Drone: Remote Control Warfare. Cambridge: MIT Press.
HC Deb. 2020. vol 686, col 307. Accessed December 16 https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/ 
2 0 2 0 - 1 2 - 1 6 / d e b a t e s / 5 3 1 F 8 1 5 F - 6 7 E A - 4 5 9 4 - A 0 1 D - D 5 C B 7 3 D 9 3 8 B F / A r m s  
(ExportsAndRemoteWarfare )
Hoffman, Frank G. 2009. “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.” JFQ 52 (1): 34–39.
Hoffman, Frank G. 2016. “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, 
Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War.” The Heritage Foundation 25–36.
Huelss, Hendrik. 2019. “Deciding on Appropriate Use of Force: Human-Machine Interaction in 
Weapons Systems and Emerging Norms.” Global Policy 10 (3): 354–358.
Ignatieff, Michael. 2001. Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. New York: Macmillan.
DEFENCE STUDIES 443
Jelfs, Timothy. 2020. “Over There? War Writing, Lethal Technology, and Democracy in America.” 
In Remote Warfare: New Cultures of Violence, edited by Adelman, Rebecca A. and David Kieran, 
153–175. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Karagiannis, Emmanuel. 2021. “Russian Surrogate Warfare in Ukraine and Syria: Understanding 
the Utility of Militias and Private Military Companies.” Journal of Balkan and near Eastern 
Studies 23 (4): 549–565. doi:10.1080/19448953.2021.1888603.
Kinsey, Christopher, and Helene Olsen. 2021. “Remote Warfare and the Utility of Military and 
Security Contractors.” In Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by 
McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 64–78. Bristol: E-IR 
Publishing.
Knight, Michael. 1972. “Rep. William Ryan, West Side Liberal, Is Dead of Cancer.” The New York 
Times, September 18. https://www.nytimes.com/1972/09/18/archives/rep-william-ryan-west- 
side-liberal-is-dead-of-cancer-rep-william-f.html 
Knowles, Emily, and Abigail Watson. 2018. Remote Warfare: Lessons Learned from Contemporary 
Theatres. London: Oxford Research Group.
Krieg, Andreas. 2018. Defining Remote Warfare: The Rise of the Private Military and Security 
Industry. London: Oxford Research Group.
Krieg, Andreas, and Jean-Mark Rickli. 2018. “Surrogate Warfare: The Art of War in the 21st 
Century?” Defence Studies 18 (2): 113–130. doi:10.1080/14702436.2018.1429218.
Lanoszka, Alexander. 2016. “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern 
Europe.” International Affairs 92 (1): 175–195. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12509.
Lee, Peter. 2018. “The Distance Paradox: Reaper, the Human Dimension of Remote Warfare, and 
Future Challenges for the RAF.” Air and Space Power Review 21 (3): 106–130.
Luttwak, Edward N. 1995. “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare.” Foreign Affairs 74 (3): 109–122. 
doi:10.2307/20047127.
Mälksoo, Maria. 2018. “Countering Hybrid Warfare as Ontological Security Management: The 
Emerging Practices of the EU and NATO.” European Security 27 (3): 374–392. doi:10.1080/ 
09662839.2018.1497984.
Mason, Corinne L. 2019. “Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Flattening Intersectionality in Canadian 
Aid.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 25 (2): 203–219. doi:10.1080/11926422.2019.1592002.
McDonald, Jack. 2021. “Remote Warfare and the Legitimacy of Military Capabilities.” Defence 
Studies Online First.
Moghadam, Assaf, and Michel Wyss. 2020. “The Political Power of Proxies: Why Nonstate Actors 
Use Local Surrogates.” International Security 44 (4): 119–157. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00377.
Moran, Jon. 2015. Remote Warfare (RW): Developing a Framework for Evaluating Its Use. London: 
Remote Control Project.
New England Action Research. 1973. “Toys against the People (Or Remote Warfare).” Science for 
the People, January 1. https://archive.scienceforthepeople.org/vol-5/v5n1/remote-warfare/ 
Ohlin, Jens David. 2017a. “Introduction.” In Research Handbook on Remote Warfare, edited by 
Ohlin, Jens David, 1–11. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Ohlin, Jens David. 2017b. “Remoteness and Reciprocal Risk.” In Research Handbook on Remote 
Warfare, edited by Ohlin, Jens David, 15–49. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2016. “Proxy Agents, Auxiliary Forces and Sovereign Defection: Assessing the 
Outcomes of Using Non-State Actors in Civil Conflicts.” Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies 16 (1): 91–111. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1148416.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2018. “A Structural-Relational Analysis of Party Dynamics in Proxy Wars.” 
International Relations 32 (4): 449–467. doi:10.1177/0047117818802436.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2020a. “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two.” The RUSI Journal 
165 (2): 1–10. doi:10.1080/03071847.2020.1736437.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2020b. “Towards a Typology of Non-State Actors in ‘Hybrid Warfare’: Proxy, 
Auxiliary, Surrogate and Affiliated Forces.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33 (6): 
868–887. doi:10.1080/09557571.2019.1656600.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2021a. “‘Proxy War’ - A Reconceptualisation.” Civil Wars 23 (1): 1–24. 
doi:10.1080/13698249.2021.1860578.
444 R. BIEGON ET AL.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2021b. “Framers, Founders, and Reformers: Three Generations of Proxy War 
Research.” Contemporary Security Policy 42 (1): 113–134. doi:10.1080/13523260.2020.1800240.
Rauta, Vladimir. 2021c. “A Conceptual Critique of Remote Warfare.” Defence Studies Online First.
Rauta, Vladimir, Matthew Ayton, Alexandra Chinchilla, Andreas Krieg, Christopher Rickard, and 
Jean-Marc Rickli. 2019. “A Symposium – Debating ‘Surrogate Warfare’ and the Transformation 
of War.” Defence Studies 19 (4): 410–430. doi:10.1080/14702436.2019.1680290.
Rauta, Vladimir, and Sean Monaghan. 2021. “Global Britain in the Grey Zone: Between Statecraft 
and Stagecraft“ Contemporary Security Policy doi:10.1080/13523260.2021.1980984, Online First.
Ravitch, Diane. 2007. EdSpeak: A Glossary of Education Terms, Phrases, Buzzwords, and Jargon. 
Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
Renz, Bettina. 2016. “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare.’” Contemporary Politics 22 (3): 283–300. 
doi:10.1080/13569775.2016.1201316.
Richards, Julian. 2021. “Intelligence Sharing in Remote Warfare.” In Remote Warfare 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by McKay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and 
Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 48–63. Bristol: E-IR Publishing.
Richardson, Michael. 2020. “Of Games and Drones. Mediating Traumatic Affect in the Age of 
Remote Warfare.” In Remote Warfare: New Cultures of Violence, edited by Adelman, Rebecca A. 
and David Kieran, 127–152. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Riemann, Malte, and Norma Rossi. 2021b. “Remote Warfare as ‘Security of Being’: Reading 
Security Force Assistance as an Ontological Security Routine.” Defence Studies Online First.
Riemann, Malte, and Normal Rossi. 2021a. “Outsourcing Death, Sacrifice and Remembrance: The 
Socio-Political Effects of Remote Warfare.” In Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
edited by Mckay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 79–95. Bristol: 
E-International Relations Publishing.
Robertson, Nic 2009. “Remote Warfare Ushers New Kind of Stress.” CNN, July 23. http://edition. 
cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/07/23/wus.warfare.pilots.uav/index.html 
Rogers, Paul. 2013. “Security by ‘Remote Control’ Can It Work?” The RUSI Journal 158 (3): 14–20. 
doi:10.1080/03071847.2013.807581.
Routley, Laura. 2014. “Developmental States in Africa? A Review of Ongoing Debates and 
Buzzwords.” Development Policy Review 32 (2): 159–177. doi:10.1111/dpr.12049.
Schnable, Allison, Anthony DeMattee, Rachel Sullivan Robinson, and Jennifer N. Brass. 2021. 
“International Development Buzzwords: Understanding Their Use among Donors, NGOs, and 
Academics.” The Journal of Development Studies 57 (1): 26–44. doi:10.1080/ 
00220388.2020.1790532.
Schulzke, Markus. 2016. “The Morality of Remote Warfare: Against the Asymmetry Objection to 
Remote Weaponry.” Political Studies 64 (1): 90–105. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12155.
Shiban, Baraa, and Camilla Molyneux. 2021. “The Human Cost of Remote Warfare in Yemen.” In 
Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Mckay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, and 
Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 110–131. Bristol: E-International Relations.
Sjoberg, Laura. 2015. “Intimacy, Warfare, and Gender Hierarchy.” Political Geography 44 (1): 
74–76. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.09.008.
Stoddard, Edward, and Sorina Toltica. 2021. “Practising Remote Warfare: Analysing the Remote 
Character of the Saudi/UAE Intervention in Yemen.” Defence Studies Online First.
The Labour Party. 2019. “Manifesto: A New Internationalism.” https://labour.org.uk/manifesto- 
2019/a-new-internationalism/ 
Trenta, Luca. 2021. “Remote Killing? Remoteness, Covertness, and the US Government’s 
Involvement in Assassination.” Defence Studies Online First.
Ucko, David H., and Thomas. A. Marks. 2018. “Violence in Context: Mapping the Strategies and 
Operational Art of Irregular Warfare.” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (2): 206–233. 
doi:10.1080/13523260.2018.1432922.
Waldman, Thomas. 2021. Vicarious Warfare: American Strategy and the Illusion of War on the 
Cheap. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
Walker, David M. 2018. “American Military Culture and the Strategic Seduction of Remote 
Warfare.” Journal of War & Culture Studies 11 (1): 5–21. doi:10.1080/17526272.2017.1416763.
DEFENCE STUDIES 445
Watson, Abigail, and Karlshøj-Pedersen Megan. 2019. Fusion Doctrine in Five Steps: Lessons 
Learned from Remote Warfare in Africa. London: Oxford Research Group.
Watson, Abigail, and McKay Alasdair. 2021. “Remote Warfare: A Critical Introduction.” In 
Remote Warfare Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Mckay, Alasdair, Abigail Watson, 
and Megan Karlshøj-Pedersen, 7–33. Bristol: E-International Relations.
Watts, Thomas F. A., and Rubrick Biegon. 2017. Defining Remote Warfare: Security Cooperation. 
London: Oxford Research Group.
Watts, Thomas F. A., and Rubrick Biegon. 2019. “Conceptualising Remote Warfare: The Past, 
Present, and Future.” Oxford Research Group. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/con 
ceptualising-remote-warfare-the-pastpresent-and-future 
Watts, Thomas F. A., and Rubrick Biegon. 2021Revisiting the Remoteness of Remote Warfare: US 
Military Intervention in Libya during Obama's Presidency Defence Studies Online First.
Williams, John. 2015. “Distant Intimacy: Space, Drones, and Just War.” Ethics and International 
Affairs 29 (1): 93–110. doi:10.1017/S0892679414000793.
Zeitlin, Michael. 2020. “An Entirely New Method of Conducting War at A Distance’: The First 
World War and the Air War and the Air War of the Future.” In Remote Warfare: New Cultures 
of Violence, edited by Adelman, Rebecca A. and David Kieran, 31–52. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press.
446 R. BIEGON ET AL.
